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Summary
This article examines the role of extension provisions for collective agreements in France, Portugal
and Spain, three countries that have faced pressure to introduce more flexibility in their employment
regimes during recent economic crises. The article establishes the continuing importance of
extension provisions for maintaining high bargaining coverage in all three countries and traces the
origin of national differences in their evolution to the strategies of the various actors, governments,
employers and trade unions, and the context in which they are operating. It also looks at the
characteristics of the extension regulations themselves.
Résumé
Cet article examine le rôle des mécanismes d’extension des accords collectifs en France, au
Portugal et en Espagne, trois pays qui ont été contraints d’introduire plus de flexibilité dans leurs
régimes d’emploi durant les récentes crises économiques. L’article établit l’importance constante
des dispositifs d’extension pour maintenir une couverture de négociation élevée dans ces trois
pays et retrace l’origine des différences nationales dans leur évolution par rapport aux stratégies
des différents acteurs, gouvernements, employeurs et syndicats, et au contexte dans lequel ils
fonctionnent. Il examine également les caractéristiques des règles d’extension proprement dites.
Zusammenfassung
Der vorliegende Artikel untersucht die Regelungen für die Ausweitung von Tarifverträgen in
Frankreich, Portugal und Spanien. In diesen drei Ländern gibt es Forderungen nach mehr
Flexibilität in der Gestaltung von Arbeitsverträgen vor dem Hintergrund der Wirtschaftskrisen
der letzten Jahre. Der Artikel beschreibt die unverminderte Bedeutung dieser Ausweitungsre-
gelungen für den Erhalt eines hohen Deckungsgrades von Tarifverträgen in allen drei Ländern
und geht den Ursachen für unterschiedliche nationale Entwicklungen entsprechend den
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Strategien der einzelnen Akteure, Regierungen, Arbeitgeber und Gewerkschaften in ihrem
jeweiligen Handlungskontext nach. Der Artikel befasst sich ebenfalls mit den Merkmalen der
verschiedenen Ausweitungsregelungen.
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Introduction
This article focuses on the extension of multi-employer collective agreements in Europe.
Extensions enable the application of agreements to workers and companies that are not
affiliated to the social partners responsible for their negotiation, whether trade unions or
employer organisations. They provide important support for collective bargaining in the Eur-
opean Union.
Different forms of extension have been developed within the EU. This article examines exten-
sions in three southern European countries: France, Portugal and Spain. These are all state-
influenced market economies associated with a highly regulated model of capitalism (Schmidt,
2012). In recent decades pressures have developed to introduce more flexibility into the three
countries’ industrial relations systems. During the recent economic crisis, Portugal and Spain faced
such pressures from the so-called ‘Troika’ (the European Central Bank, the European Commission
and the International Monetary Fund) in return for aid. In the case of France, by contrast, pressures
were generated rather internally by political and business actors. This article examines extension
provisions in the face of such pressures
The focus will be on the effectiveness of extensions in continuing to discharge two functions
identified by Visser (2016): (i) enabling the coverage of collective agreements to extend beyond
the parties directly involved in the negotiation and signing of agreements and (ii) promoting
collective bargaining. We examine this effectiveness within the framework of a number of key
variables: the role of the actors associated with the provisions, the nature of the provisions, and
their institutional, economic and historical context. The state is a central actor in the establishment
of extension provisions, given its regulatory capacity to construct, formalise, and restructure
institutions (Howell, 2016). It is not a monolith, however. At different times, different political
configurations exercise power to different ends in the name of the state. The stability of govern-
ments and their ideological emphasis will vary, influencing their interest in and capacity to initiate
change in institutions. As well as the state’s political actors there are also public agencies that can
influence the institutional practices of the social actors, such as the judiciary.
An emphasis on the role of the state means that attention tends to be concentrated on the role of
the regulatory framework to explain the development of industrial relations institutions. But the
maintenance of effective institutions also depends on a supportive culture among the industrial
relations actors (Streeck and Thelen, 2005). We therefore need to look at union and employer
orientations towards extension provisions. Their attitudes may in turn be influenced by actor
characteristics (for example, degree of unity, organisation and representation), as well as the power
relationships between them.
The detailed characteristics and origin of the regulatory framework may also influence the
operation of extensions. Provisions may differ along a number of dimensions, including the degree
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to which they are embedded in a country’s constitution, the requirements for them to be activated
and the provisions for exemption from extension.
Finally, the institutional, historical and economic context within which extension provisions
are located may influence their evolution. Extension provisions co-exist with other institutions
that do not necessarily share their aims and can come to challenge them (Streeck and Thelen,
2005). One competing institution might be company-level bargaining and the space it occupies
in relation to multi-employer bargaining. The historical context of extension provision might
relate to the circumstances of their establishment and their degree of embeddedness in the
industrial relations system. Furthermore, globalisation and the crises of the past decade
have provided a challenging economic context for extension provisions, which warrants
examination.
Extension of collective agreements
Countries in which multi-employer bargaining predominates generally have broader bargaining
coverage (Visser, 2013a). The strength of multi-employer bargaining in turn is related to the
existence of strong and representative bargaining partners and supportive state policies, the most
important of which may be the extension of collective agreements (Schulten et al., 2015).
The extension of collective agreements has a long history in the EU. But although extension
provisions are widespread their characteristics differ. Schulten et al. (2015) identified two different
approaches. First, there is the extension of collective agreements to non-organised workers in
companies affiliated to the employer bodies negotiating an agreement, preventing companies from
discriminating between unionised and non-unionised workers. There is a legal erga omnes provi-
sion in most European countries that supports this type of extension. The second approach is the
extension of an agreement to workers in non-affiliated companies. This typically would be carried
out by administrative extension through a declaration of general applicability by the relevant
ministry. There are, however, variations to this second approach. In some countries there are
functional equivalents to extension, which have the impact of declarations of general applicability.
Thus in Italy, collectively agreed minimum wages are taken by courts as a point of reference when
assessing whether wages conform to the constitutional requirement of fair pay. Another variation is
to establish a legal erga omnes provision that applies to all employers and therefore all workers in a
sector, organised or not (as in Spain). Although extension provisions exist in most European
countries the frequency of use varies. In nine EU countries the use of extension provisions is very
common, common or general, whereas in other countries their use is rare or limited, or they are not
used at all (Hayter and Visser, 2018).
Hayter and Visser (2018) identified three different extension regimes: the semi-automatic, the
supportive and the restrictive. In semi-automatic regimes there is no need for a public authority to
make a decision to extend an agreement. As long as the collective agreement is valid and nego-
tiated by duly constituted and representative parties, it has general applicability to all workers and
employers in its sector, often without a need for the parties to request extension. Hayter and Visser
identified seven countries – including France and Spain – in this category (although, as we shall
see, recent reforms raise a question mark about France’s inclusion). The Portuguese regime could
be characterised as semi-automatic until 2011 (Schulten, 2016).
Supportive regimes are more complicated. Extension is typically applied by decision of
the appropriate Ministry and normally the negotiating bodies must have requested
extension. In reaching its decision the Ministry may have to take into account whether
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an agreement fulfils certain criteria, often in relation to its representativeness or public
interest.1 This category includes Belgium, Croatia, Germany, Italy, Netherlands, Portugal,
Slovenia, South Africa and Switzerland.
Finally, ‘restrictive regimes’ have more demanding criteria that must be met before extensions
can be instituted, such as a proportion of workers in a sector who must be employed in affiliated
companies. Hayter and Visser (2018) identified 12 countries in this category: Albania, Bulgaria,
Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, India, Ireland, Israel, Latvia, Norway, Romania and Slovakia.
The significance of extension provisions for collective bargaining coverage has been regularly
emphasised. Traxler et al. (2001) argue that in many European countries state support is the most
important variable explaining high bargaining coverage, with administrative extension of collec-
tive agreements being the most important instrument. The effect of extension regimes on bargain-
ing coverage is not easy to establish, however (Hayter and Visser, 2018). In most countries where
extensions are employed, bargaining coverage is much higher than union membership density,
because erga omnes provisions extend agreements to all workers in firms covered by agreements,
regardless of union membership. Hayter and Visser (2018) calculate the gap between the propor-
tion of employees working in organised firms and the bargaining coverage when seeking to
identify the effect of different extension regimes. They found the largest effect in the semi-
automatic regimes, ranging from 30 percentage points in France to 16 points in the case of Finland.
Such analyses rely on the availability of dependable data on employer organisation. As Visser
(2013a, 2016) comments, however, such data are sparse. It was not until 2013, on the occasion of
the fourth edition of the ICTWSS2 (Visser, 2013b) that an attempt was made to present data on
employer organisation. It is difficult to obtain reliable data because of employers’ tendency to
affiliate to more than one association (which results in double counting) and the dependence on
estimates from employer organisations themselves (which are prone to exaggerate their member-
ship) (Cazes et al., 2019).
The value of extension provisions has been debated. It has been argued that, by setting common
working conditions within the same industry, wage inequality is limited and collective bargain-
ing’s protective and distributive functions are strengthened (Carcillo et al., 2020; Martins, 2020;
Villanueva, 2015). Concern has been expressed about whether extensions are in the public interest
if they come at the expense of reduced employment and company well-being, however (Martins,
2020; OECD, 2017; Villanueva, 2015). Scholars have also criticised the anti-competitive effect of
binding agreements, suggesting that established companies in employers’ associations have an
interest in extending collective agreements so that wages are increased to raise rivals’ costs and
make new entries to a sector less viable (Haucap et al., 2001).
There is also a debate among the social partners on the merits of extensions. Employers express
concern about their lack of flexibility. Thus we have seen the introduction of exemption provisions
from extended agreements in some countries, whereby companies claim that they are unable to
meet the terms of agreements. Many small firms value agreement extensions, however, because
1 The meaning of ‘public interest’ varies according to national context. In France and Portugal there has
been an increasing emphasis on economic and social considerations in the evaluation of extensions. In
France the government’s concern has been to ensure that extensions do not undermine competition or
damage vulnerable workers and firms (including SMEs). The Portuguese government similarly empha-
sised the need for extended agreements to meet positive economic criteria but widened the criteria to
include a consideration of their impact on inequality and the position of women.
2 Database on the Institutional Characteristics of Trade Unions, Wage Setting, State Intervention and Social
Pacts, Jelle Visser, Amsterdam Institute for Advanced Labour Studies AIAS.
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they establish a level playing field for all companies in a sector and minimise uncertainty (Rocha,
2018). Trade unions worry about the effect of extensions on union membership because workers
benefit from the agreements regardless of such membership. Most unions value extensions, how-
ever, because they enable their negotiating power to reach workers in many companies in which
union presence is limited.
Extension provisions in three southern European countries
France
The origin of extension provisions in France lies in the 1936 Statute, introduced when the Popular
Front government sought to strengthen collective bargaining and trade unions had low member-
ship, and were unstable and divided (Sturmthal, 1951). The law provided that the government
could extend agreements reached by the ‘most representative organisations’ when requested by
one of the bargaining parties. The term ‘most representative’ could include more than one orga-
nisation (preventing the CGT from obtaining a monopolistic position) and was not dependent on
membership alone, taking into account a union’s age, role in past negotiations, financial stability
and conditions of membership. The trade union movement viewed the new legislation positively
(Sturmthal, 1951) and the employers were comfortable with a system that established a level
playing field for their sector at minimum conditions, while giving them scope at company level
to organise work as they saw appropriate (Goetschy, 2002).
The Ministry of Labour has retained the right to decide on extension provisions. Only valid
agreements can be extended. Since 2008, to be valid an agreement must be signed by one or several
unions that obtained 30 per cent of the votes cast in the first round of workplace elections (this
validity criterion applies to agreements at workplace, sectoral and interprofessional levels). Like-
wise, it must be signed, where appropriate, by at least one representative employers’ federation. An
agreement ceases to be valid if contested by one or more unions that obtained a majority of votes in
workplace elections.
From 2017 the Ministry of Labour was required to pay more attention to the public interest.
Reforms provided for the Ministry to be advised by an independent group of experts on the
economic and social effects of extensions. Furthermore, extensions could be rejected if they did
not include special provisions for small firms, were considered harmful to vulnerable groups of
firms and workers or risked undermining competition. These changes took place in the context of
the discussion of the advantages and disadvantages of extension provisions and the relatively rare
use of an existing provision on taking into account the public interest in extension decisions
(OECD, 2017).
The use of extensions in France is not therefore an automatic process and approval by the
Ministry of Labour is required. This approval has normally been forthcoming, however, contribut-
ing to a high coverage rate (94 per cent; Visser, 2019).
In 1947 membership levels were introduced as a criterion for considering trade unions to be
‘representative’, but additional criteria such as political independence and having a patriotic stance
in the war encouraged the role of smaller unions (Parsons, 2013). Since 2012–2013 representative
status has been based on union performance in workplace elections. At workplace level unions
must obtain 10 per cent of the votes cast in the first round of elections. At sectoral level a union has
to obtain 8 per cent of the aggregate vote (votes cast in the first round of elections for works council
representatives, for single staff delegates and in ballots in companies with fewer than 11 employ-
ees). In 2014 and 2016, legislation for the first time introduced criteria for ‘representative’
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employer organisations, which have to prove they represent 8 per cent of the sector’s companies or
8 per cent of its employees (Rehfeldt and Vincent, 2018).
Initially, following the 1936 Statute, representative status was held by two unions: the CGT
(Confédération Générale du Travail), linked to the French Communist Party, and the catholic and
confessional CFTC (Confédération Française des Travailleurs Chrétiens). Currently three addi-
tional unions enjoy representative status: CFDT (la Confédération Francaise Démocratique du
Travail), a secular independent breakaway from the CFTC; FO (Force Ouvrière), a breakaway of
activists worried by the CGT’s lack of independence from the Communist Party; and CGC (Con-
fédération Générale des Cadres), representing professional/managerial staff. The CGT represents
the more militant wing, being less willing to negotiate flexibility at enterprise level or support
government-promoted liberal reforms. From 2017, the CFDT enjoyed the most support in repre-
sentativeness elections. It tends to be more willing to sign agreements and negotiate and seek to
influence government-proposed reforms. Three employer organisations also meet the representa-
tive criterion: MEDEF (Mouvement des entreprises de France), the largest, representing 750,000
firms; CPME (Confédération des petites et moyennes entreprises) predominantly representing
SMEs; and UPA (Union Professionelle Artisanale) representing craft-based firms. They tend to
show more unity than the unions.
Parallel to extension provisions the state has promoted decentralised bargaining, beginning with
the Auroux laws of 1982, and continuing with legislation in 1996, 1998, 2000 and 2004. The El
Khomri Law of 2016, under the Hollande government, and the Macron government’s Ordinances
of 2017 maintained this process by facilitating agreements at company level in the absence of a
union and diluting the favourability principle, whereby sectoral agreements had priority over
company negotiations (Rehfeldt and Vincent, 2018).
These legislative changes have resulted in the growth of a company-based bargaining system,
supported by employer organisations. This has not affected the coverage of extensions, but has
reduced their importance. More issues are now negotiated at company level. The number of
company-based agreements increased from 8500 in 1995 to 39,000 in 2013. In 2014–2016, 65
per cent of employees in companies with more than 10 employees were covered by company
agreements (Dares, 2019). Although a minority of companies directly engage in bargaining (38 per
cent between 2014 and 2016), as Figure 1 indicates, they include most large firms and a not
insignificant proportion of small firms.














The system of industrial relations that emerged in Portugal following the dictatorship in 1974
developed in a post-revolutionary climate favourable for trade union rights. The principal trade
unions – the communist-linked General Confederation of Portuguese Workers (CGTP) and the
socialist-inclined General Union of Workers (UGT) – faced with the employers’ reluctance to
negotiate, sought government intervention. In this context extension provisions were introduced.
If the negotiating parties requested it, the Ministry of Labour extended an agreement to all
workers in a given sector and it remained in force until replaced by a new agreement, which could
not be less favourable for workers than the previous one (Barreto and Naumann, 2002). No legal
criteria existed concerning what constituted a representative trade union for bargaining purposes.
The extension provision contributed to a typical bargaining coverage rate of around 60 per cent,
counting only new agreements and new extensions of existing agreements, or over 90 per cent if
pre-existing, still valid agreements were counted (Schulten et al., 2015).
In the 1980s and 1990s, employers and their organisations (including the Confederation of
Portuguese Industry [CIP] and the Confederation of Portuguese Commerce [CCP]), faced with
increasing globalisation and competition, began to campaign for more flexibility. In response, in
2003–2004, a new Labour Code was adopted by the centre-right government. The favourability
principle (whereby collective agreements could only set more favourable conditions than legisla-
tive standards) was eliminated and agreements not renegotiated for a number of years could expire.
The government also temporarily stopped extending collective agreements (a step reversed by the
Socialist government elected in 2005). Revision of the Labour Code in 2009 further limited the
renewal of agreements. The unions’ ability to oppose these changes was limited by their disunity
(Távora, 2019). The CGTP put the emphasis upon worker mobilisation. The UGT, more willing to
negotiate, sought to use its influence with the government to defend workers’ rights.
During the economic crisis of 2010–2014, Portugal accepted a debt bailout from the ‘Troika’
and in 2011 signed a memorandum of understanding specifying reforms to be implemented,
including a review of extension provisions. Extensions were almost completely suspended by the
incoming centre-right government, and, a year later, in October 2012, restrictive criteria for
extension were introduced. This was opposed by the social partners. Agreements could be
extended only if the signatory employer bodies represented companies employing at least half the
workers in the sector, making extensions unlikely (Schulten et al., 2015).
Figure 2 indicates the pattern of extension provision and collective agreements negotiated from
2000 to 2018. From 2012 to 2014, immediately following the 2012 restrictions, the number of
annual extension decrees varied between nine and 17 compared with over 100 in the previous
years. In addition, the number of new multi-employer agreements and new extensions of existing
agreements (published agreements) declined from an annual average of 272 between 2000 and
2011 to 37 between 2012 and 2014. Employers became less interested in negotiating multi-
employer agreements as competition could not be avoided if all companies could not be bound
by an agreement (Schulten et al., 2015).
The impact of the change in extension provision on bargaining coverage has been debated
(Addison et al., 2015). The proportion of workers covered by new agreements or the renegotiation
of existing agreements declined significantly from an average 84 per cent in the five years before
the financial and economic crisis. Including workers covered by valid pre-existing agreements,
however, coverage remained high, at 74 per cent (Visser, 2019).
Under pressure from unions and employer bodies (the latter being concerned about unfair
competition in the absence of extensions (Eurofound, 2013)), in 2014 the Portuguese
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government began to relax the extension criteria and extension became possible if at least 30 per
cent of the contracting employer association members were SMEs. Given the structure of the
Portuguese economy, with 97 per cent of firms SMEs, employing 83.5 per cent of employees
(Eurostat, 2018), most agreements met the new criteria. In 2017 the government went further,
abandoning representativeness criteria for extensions and focusing on public interest criteria
related to the wage and economic impact of agreements, including their effects on inequality and
the position of women.
The relaxation of criteria has contributed to an increase in the number of extensions (Figure 2),
although they have not regained pre-crisis levels. The number of published agreements remains
lower than before the crisis, suggesting a continuing reliance on a stock of agreements that have not
been renewed recently and have lost their regulatory capacity and relevance (Müller et al., 2019).
Távora (2019) has related this partly to changes in the 2012 Labour Code introduced by the Social
Democrat government, which provide for reductions in overtime pay and make it easier for
employers to introduce working time accounts at company level. These company-level options,
together with limits on the renewal of agreements, have changed the balance of power, reducing
employers’ incentive to maintain sectoral bargaining and making the unions, particularly the
CGTP, reluctant to sign agreements that concede employer demands for flexibility. In addition,
it is proving to be a complicated and contentious process to revise those longstanding agreements
which were not reviewed during the crisis when bargaining activity was at a low level.
Spain
The establishment of the Spanish system of industrial relations under democracy in the second half
of the 1970s took place in a favourable environment for the unions, who were important prota-
gonists in shaping the new democracy. CC.OO (Workers Commissions) had been associated with
the opposition to the dictatorship. The UGT (the General Workers Union), an important union in
pre-civil war Spain, became active during the democratic transition. The unions were in a strong
position to help shape a favourable legal framework.
The Workers’ Statute of 19803 provided for the establishment of works councils in companies
and introduced the automatic extension of collective agreements to all companies and workers in a









Agreements and  Extension 2000-2018. 
Extensions Published mul-employer agreements
Figure 2. Multi-employer agreements and extensions (2000–2018).
Source: DGERT, Ministry of Labour, 2019.
3 The Workers’ Statute is the framework legislation providing employment rights in Spain. It was published
in its approved form on 10 March1980. Available at: http://www.mites.gob.es/es/sec_leyes/trabajo/esta
tuto06/index.htm (accessed 20 October 2020).
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intervention. Agreements continued to apply unless superseded by a new agreement (the ‘ultra-
activity’ principle). Until the financial crisis the only significant modification was in 1994, when
agreements were obliged to include provisions that enable employers to avoid wage agreements on
the grounds of financial difficulties. The Trade Union Freedom Act of 19854 introduced the status
of ‘representative union’: this applies to unions that obtain 10 per cent of works council members
or delegates elected in a sector that therefore have the right to negotiate sectoral agreements.
This legal framework contributed to high bargaining coverage, averaging over 70 per cent in the
four years (2006–2009) before the financial and economic crisis hit (CCNCC, 2020). The most
important bargaining level was the sectoral. In 2008, of the workers covered by bargaining, 90 per
cent were covered by multi-employer agreements and only 10 per cent by company agreements
(CCNCC, 2020).
In the 1980s there were divisions between trade unions, based on ideological and strategic
differences (the CC.OO was close to the Communist Party and the UGT to the Socialist Party). In
the 1990s, however, a high degree of unity developed. As regards the employers, one main
organisation, the Confederación Española de Organizaciones Empresariales (CEOE), has repre-
sented their interests at national level since the democratic transition. The CEOE has pursued a
strategy of negotiation and social dialogue. Both union and employer representatives have viewed
positively the extension provisions.
Spain’s recent economic crisis began in 2008. A reform package was introduced by the right-
wing government in 2012 to meet the ‘Troika’s’ demands, in return for a bank bailout (Rocha,
2018). The reforms made it easier for companies to avoid implementing sectoral agreements,
prioritised company over sectoral agreements and limited ultra-activity to 14–18 months.
Despite the opportunities the reforms offered to employers, there have been minimal changes to
the structure of bargaining. Coverage has remained high at 78 per cent, with only 8 per cent of
workers covered by company agreements (CCNCC, 2020). Few employers have sought to avoid
sectoral agreements both because they appreciate the advantages of multi-employer agreements
and because they are uncertain about the legality of the reform measures (both factors are discussed
in more detail in the next section). In 2016, only 0.3 per cent of workers were subject to the non-
application of sectoral agreements. The limitation on ultra-activity had little impact. Employer
organisations agreed with unions to extend the terms of existing agreements (doubts about the
change’s legal status were confirmed by a Supreme Court judgment in 2015). Automatic extension
has therefore operated consistently in post-Franco industrial relations.
Explaining the evolution of extension provisions in France, Portugal
and Spain
This article has acknowledged the recent development of extension provisions in France, Portugal
and Spain. We initially posed the question of whether these provisions made it possible to extend
the coverage of collective bargaining beyond the parties directly involved in the negotiation of
agreements and promoted collective bargaining.
Table 1 presents data on trade union membership density, employer organisation and bargaining
coverage for the countries under consideration. It suggests that the level of employer organisation
4 The Trade Union Freedom Act regulates the activities of trade unions and establishes freedom of asso-
ciation. It was published in its approved form on 2 August 1985. Available at: https://www.boe.es/buscar/
act.php?id¼BOE-A-1985-16660 (accessed 20 October 2020).
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is more important than union density in influencing bargaining coverage. In all countries, coverage
far exceeds union density.
Table 1 largely employs ICTWSS data (Visser, 2019), with three exceptions: employers’
organisations in France and Spain and bargaining coverage in Spain. We have already raised
concerns about data on employers’ organisations. We employed additional sources to reduce these
problems. For France we used a national census carried out in 2017 (Dares, 2018) and for Spain
expert opinion reported in 1999 (Miguelez, 1999). No source other than ICTWSS was identified
for Portugal. Nonetheless the levels reported in Table 1 are likely to overstate the level of employer
organisation (as the DARES report points out in the case of France). Bargaining coverage in Spain
is subject to varying estimates, including 85 per cent (ETUI, 2016) and 68 per cent in 2017 (Visser,
2019). Our estimate is based on the definitive data for workers covered in 2017 (CCNCC, 2020).
The evidence of Table 1, together with the proviso on the inflation of employer coverage data,
suggest that extension provisions in all three countries extend the coverage of collective bargaining
significantly beyond the workers employed by affiliated employers and boost its impact. The effect
appears to be greatest in France, but it is still significant in Portugal and Spain. We now consider
differences in the evolution of extension provisions with reference to the variable framework
introduced earlier.
Collective bargaining in all three countries exists in an economic context of globalisation and
crisis, with increasing pressures to extend flexibility. National responses have varied, however. In
France and Portugal the criteria for granting extensions have come under scrutiny: in France there
has been a shift from focusing on the representative status of the negotiating parties to giving
importance to the wider public interest and the social and economic effects of extensions; in
Portugal, initially extension was made more difficult but recent changes, again incorporating
public interest criteria, have encouraged an increase in the number of extensions, but not yet to
pre-crisis levels. It is too early to evaluate the impact of these changes. In Spain there has been no
review of the relevant criteria and no significant modification of the extension mechanism itself.
In Portugal and, especially, France, there has also been a challenge to the significance of
extension provisions and multi-employer bargaining. In Portugal the regulatory regime has
strengthened employers’ ability to implement changes in working time at company level and
made it easier for agreements to expire. This has shifted the balance of power in bargaining and
made it more difficult to reach multi-employer agreements. In France, the growth of company
bargaining means that many issues determining employment conditions are resolved at company
level (Dufresne and Maggi-Germain, 2012). Extension provisions continue to be important in
establishing coverage but the importance of that coverage has been reduced as regards content.
These changes in the institutional context of extensions in the two countries point to the type of
Table 1. Comparative data: union membership, employer organisation and bargaining coverage (%).
Density of union
membership Employer organisation density* Bargaining coverage**
France 10.8 66 (2017)a 75 (2013) 94 (2018)
Portugal 18.4 – 65 (2013) 74 (2016)
Spain 18.9 60 (1999)b 75 (1995) 78 (2017)c
Notes: * This is the proportion of employees in employment employed in organisations affiliated to employer organisations.
** Percentage of workers with the right to bargain (Visser, 2019).
Sources: Unless otherwise stated: Visser (2019) (the dates in brackets following ICTWSS data refer to year of origin of the
data); a Dares (2018); b Miguelez (1999); c CCNCC (2020).
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gradual transformative change identified by Streeck and Thelen (2005), whereby ‘traditional
arrangements are discredited or pushed to the side in favour of new institutions and associated
behavioural logics’.
In Spain, changes to the institutional context of multi-employer bargaining have not presented
the same challenges. Giving primacy to company-level bargaining has had little impact on the
dominance of extended multi-employer agreements. The response to pressures for increased flex-
ibility has taken a different form. Multi-employer agreements themselves have become a vehicle
for wage reductions. In addition, the prominent role of temporary contracts in the Spanish labour
market and reinforced powers to unilaterally modify working conditions have provided employers
with important ‘safety valves’ (Rocha, 2018).
The different normative regimes for extension have played a part in explaining the differences
we have noted between the three countries. In Spain the extension process is automatic and
founded on basic legislation introduced during the transition to democracy. This also linked
bargaining rights to the system of worker representation and established a philosophy of inclu-
siveness as far as collective bargaining is concerned. This provided for a degree of ‘stickiness’ in
extension provisions: modification would have required a fundamental and controversial change in
the principles of Spanish industrial relations. In both France and Portugal, on the other hand, the
application of extension clauses is more exposed to government influence. It is more discretionary,
depending ultimately on an administrative decision of the Ministry of Labour and changing
provisions is not as big a legislative task – it involves modifying a clause in a specific article in
the law rather than rewriting a whole law. This greater ‘stickiness’ of the normative regime
therefore provides part of the explanation for the absence of changes in Spain’s extension criteria.
Governments and the political parties forming them have been major actors shaping the
different normative regimes of extension. The Portuguese government’s decision to accede to
‘Troika’ pressure to modify extension provisions was the main factor contributing to the decline
of collective agreements from 2011 onwards. On the other hand, the government’s relaxation of
the strict criteria for extension has helped with the recent partial recovery of collective bargain-
ing and bargaining coverage. Similarly in France successive governments have promoted the
decentralisation of bargaining and introduced wider public interest considerations into extension
decisions.
In Portugal the approach to extensions has reflected the political complexion of the relevant
government. Measures to reduce the role of extensions, starting even before the financial and
economic crisis, have coincided with centre-right governments led by the Social Democrats (PSD),
which in their winning campaign in the 2011 election announced their intention to go further than
the ‘Troika’s’ Memorandum and then unilaterally suspended extensions (Campos Lima, 2019).
Socialist-led governments, on the other hand, have been more associated with efforts to establish
concertation with the social partners. The Left Coalition, in power since 2015, was responsible for
the most recent relaxation of extension criteria (Naumann, 2018).
The decentralisation of collective bargaining in France has been reinforced during the past two
decades by governments of all political complexions. Centre-right governments have been influ-
enced by employer pressure for greater flexibility. Left-of-centre governments have traditionally
favoured decentralisation as a means of increasing local democracy and mutually beneficial
agreements (Amable, 2016).
The Spanish centre-right government in power from 2011 to 2018, during most of the financial
and economic crisis, reacted to ‘Troika’ demands by introducing mechanisms to introduce more
flexibility into the bargaining process, but it resisted pressure to modify extension provisions,
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reflecting the historical and normative weight of the post-Franco settlement, as well as the con-
cerns of other actors.
The impact of normative changes in collective bargaining institutions has also been mediated by
judicial actors, particularly in Portugal and Spain. In Portugal the Constitutional Court has ruled
several times against government labour market reforms going beyond ‘Troika’ demands, such as
legislative changes curtailing collective bargaining (Távora, 2019). The Spanish courts, tradition-
ally tending to favour worker interests, reduced the impact of crisis-led reforms. Using obligations
embodied in the Constitution, such as negotiating in good faith, they created legal uncertainty
about provisions permitting derogation from sectoral agreements. A more determined government
could have made greater efforts to redraft the legislation more tightly but this would have been
complex (Gómez, 2015).
The employer organisation level has already been discussed as a key variable influencing the
impact of extension provisions, but employer strategies have also had a part in shaping the role of
extensions in the three countries. They have avoided prioritising the limitation of extension
provisions, seeking to increase flexibility by other means. In the case of France, where the
percentage impact of extensions appears to be greatest, the peak employer body (now MEDEF)
changed its position on its preferred bargaining level several times after the Second World War,
but by the end of the 20th century emphasised the advantages of firm-level bargaining: increas-
ing flexibility, distancing the government from bargaining and increasing opportunities to evade
higher level norms.
Portuguese employers have been consistently in favour of extended sectoral agreements, wor-
ried that without them organised employers would be exposed to competition from non-affiliated
firms. Accordingly, they were opposed to the curtailment of extensions during the financial and
economic crisis. They appear, however, to be taking advantage of the flexibility provided by
regulations enabling them to trigger the expiry of agreements and to introduce changes in working
conditions at company level (Távora, 2019). As already indicated, this modification of power
relations has contributed to a situation in which collective bargaining and extension provisions
have not fully recovered from the decline experienced during the financial and economic crisis.
Spanish employers have shown most reticence in relation to decentralised bargaining. Few have
taken advantage of derogation opportunities provided by labour market reform. We have pointed
out they had other options for achieving flexibility and appreciated the advantages of multi-
employer agreements, which establish a level playing field for all employers, and obviate trans-
action costs of negotiating terms and conditions in each company. A lack of knowledge concerning
the negotiation of agreements, the absence of worker representatives in small firms and a desire not
to ‘import’ labour conflict into the firm were additional reasons for them to continue to support
multi-employer bargaining (Malo, 2015; MESS, 2014; Rocha, 2018).
The impact of trade union actors on the evolution of extension provisions has been less evident
than in the case of other actors. But although all of the unions concerned appreciate the value of
extensions in extending the coverage of agreements, differences in approach have been evident.
French unions have displayed a variety of postures in relation to bargaining reform. The CFDT,
from the 1980s onwards, became increasingly supportive of micro-level reform (Amable, 2016)
and has regarded decentralised bargaining as inevitable, reflecting changes in employment. It has
sought to take advantage of decentralisation to shape local agreements (Milner and Mathers, 2013).
By contrast, the CGT and the smaller FO have unsuccessfully resisted efforts to weaken the role of
multi-employer bargaining, while increasingly taking part in firm-level negotiations to maintain a
presence in bargaining (Milner and Mathers, 2013). This division has weakened the unions’
capacity to influence institutional change in France.
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Disunity has also weakened union influence in Portugal. The CGTP’s and the UGT’s political
identities may have been diluted but they have regularly adopted different positions in relation to
collective bargaining and social dialogue, with the UGT more willing to negotiate change. This
disunity has made it difficult for the Portuguese unions to apply concerted pressure and has
encouraged an interventionist state, reducing the credibility of tripartite agreements when there
was no guarantee their results could be implemented (Royo, 2002).
By contrast, in Spain unity has grown between the two main unions since the 1990s because of
the decreasing communist influence over CC.OO and the increasing militancy of the UGT,
together with its distancing from the Socialist Party (Stoleroff, 2013). This unity has consolidated
the unions’ status as the voice of the workers and has enabled them to maintain pressure on the state
and employer bodies to ameliorate the impact of changes in collective bargaining. Successful
union-promoted legal actions have formed part of their approach. For the unions, maintaining the
integrity of sectoral agreements (and therefore extension mechanisms) has been a priority, given
the predominance of SMEs in the economy. As a consequence, however, they have been willing to
accept poorer agreements and wage devaluation to ‘keep the employers on board’ (Cruces Agui-
lera et al., 2016).
Conclusions
Our examination of extension provisions in three southern European countries has found that
they continue to be effective in extending the coverage of collective agreements beyond the
companies directly associated with their negotiation. Our comparison shows the importance of
the nature of the regulatory framework in the functioning of extension provisions. Thus when the
representativeness of a multi-employer agreement is a key criterion for its extension (as in
Portugal in 2012–2014) the application of extension provisions is more complicated. That is
also the case when government agency plays a key role in approving extensions, as in France and
Portugal. It is too early to evaluate the impact of the recent emphasis on public interest criteria in
France and Portugal.
In the introduction we emphasised the impact of actor strategies on institutions. The support of
the principal actors has been key to the continuity of extensions: governments, employers and
unions (with the exception of Portuguese governments at particular points in time). Given the
challenging economic circumstances faced by all three countries, however, it is not surprising that
extensions have come under scrutiny from international agencies and governments seeking to
encourage more flexible employment regimes, while employers, if not questioning extensions in
themselves, have been attracted by the prospect of greater flexibility at enterprise level. Institu-
tional reforms in France and Portugal have reduced the significance of extension provisions. In
France, in particular, the promotion of company-level bargaining has challenged the role of multi-
employer bargaining and of the content of extension provisions in protecting employees. The
Spanish case is rather different. Government and employer actors have no less interest in flexi-
bility, but the latter have been able to access it without major changes to industrial relations
institutions. The reluctance of Spanish governments to modify extension provisions can be
explained by their embeddedness in one of the founding laws of the democracy, which emphasises
the importance of the origin of the regulation of institutions when explaining their evolution and
effectiveness.
Trade unions, though aware of the advantages to be derived from extension, do not appear to
have been the major protagonists in their evolution. Our analysis has shown, however, that the
unity of the Spanish unions and their maintenance of constructive relations with employer
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organisations have been important factors encouraging the stability of multi-employer agreements
and extensions. In the other two countries the lack of union unity has given more freedom to other
actors to initiate change and greater flexibility.
We have sought to show, in conclusion, that while extension provisions continue to extend the
coverage of collective agreements, particular changes in their institutional context (such as move-
ments towards bargaining decentralisation) can reduce their importance. Thus the continuance of
institutions should not conceal important changes in the way employment conditions are deter-
mined (Streeck and Thelen, 2005). Nevertheless, the active engagement of the social partners in
maintaining existing industrial relations institutions, as in Spain, can play a major role in limiting
change and maintaining their significance.
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